Библиография

Дополнительные библиографические источники и материалы

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7. Kristensen H. et al. Op. cit. P. 128.
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14. Kristensen H. et al. Op. cit. P. 134.
15. Ibid. P. 133.
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18. National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)-242. Jan. 17, 1974. URL: https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/ virtuallibrary/ documents/ nsdm/ nsdm_242.pdf.
19. Kristensen H. et al. Op. cit. P. 143–144.
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31. PPD/ NSC 60. Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy Guidance. November 1997. URL: https://fas.org/ irp/ offdocs/ pdd60.htm.
32. Kristensen H. Nukes in Taiwan Crisis. May 13, 2008. URL: https://fas.org/ blogs/ security/ 2008/ 05/ nukes-in-the-taiwan-crisis/
33. Ibidem.
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38. Norris, Kristensen. Op. cit. P. 81.
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40. Heginbotham E. et al. The U.S.-China military scorecard: forces, geography, and the evolving balance of power, 1996–2017 / RAND Corporation. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2015. P. 301. URL: https://www.rand.org/ content/ dam/ rand/ pubs/ research_reports/ RR300/ RR392/ RAND_RR392.pdf.
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45. Heginbotham E. et al., Op. cit. P. 303.
46. Ibid. P. 302–304.
47. Ibid. P. 305.
48. US Department of Defense. Annual Report to Congress. Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China. 2016.
49. U.S. Department of Defense. Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report. 2010.
50. U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review Report. 2010.
51. U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. 2014. P. 14.
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53. Li Bin, Tong Zhao (eds.). Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2016. Massachussets. 273 p. P. 126–142.
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56. Colby E., Gerson M. Op. cit. P. 53.
57. Ibid. P. 62.
58. Кокошин А.А. Обеспечение... С. 61.
59. Fravel M., Cunningham F. Assuring Assured Retaliation // International Security. Vol. 40. No. 2 (Fall 2015). P. 7–50. P. 31.
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61. Fravel, Cunningham. Op. cit.
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63. Кокошин А.А. В поисках выхода. Военно-политические аспекты международной безопасности. М.: ИМО, 1989.
64. Kulacki G. An excerpt from Yu Jin (ed.). 2004. Dierpaobing zhanyixue =The science of Second Artillery operations. URL: http://www.ucsusa.org/ sites/ default/ files/ attach/ 2014/ 09/ Kulacki-Translation%20of%20Coercion%20section%209–22–14.pdf.
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68. Futter A., Zala B. Op. cit.