Evgeniy Mekhamadiev

The paper considers two military campaigns of the West Roman general (magister militum) Aetius. One punitive expedition against the Burgundians (AD 436) and another offensive against the Huns in AD 451 might embody Aetius’ military strategy which was in active stand during all the time covered by article. The author compares the evidence on each expedition and attempts to find the new reasons of Rome’s fall strictly from the military point of view. The main question is whether we can accuse Aetius himself in deep decline of Roman frontier defence in the second half of 5th cent. On the ground of some narrative sources and two inscriptions the author determines which military units took part in the two campaigns mentioned above and discovers the common feature of these expeditions, which was the full absence of detachments placed in Italy. The main idea is that this strange fact was the direct result of Aetius’ military doctrine which presupposed the concentration of the best field detachments only in Italy without sending these troops to outside provinces. It means that Aetius stood up to the Burgundians and Huns only by the forces positioned in Gaul itself (the mercenary bands of German warriors (foederati), the colonies of Sarmatians and frontier garrisons of the Rhine districts, while the Italian field armies continued to be around Ravenna, an imperial residence. So, the main motive of such a policy was the intention not to permit the Barbarian invasion in Italy, that’s why Aetius understood his main task as to save in Italy most of the regiments which had been there earlier. As a result of this doctrine the Rhine frontier defence totally disappeared since the Rhine garrisons (the so-called Ripari) were destroyed by the Huns in the battle of Catalaunian Fields (AD 451), and this circumstance provoked the Francs to capture the Roman Gaul.